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DISCHARGING STUDENT
LOANS VIA BANKRUPTCY:
UNDUE HARDSHIP DOCTRINE
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT
ANTHONY BOWERS 

INTRODUCTION

Student loans are presumptively non-dischargeable
through bankruptcy, but the undue hardship doctrine provides
an equitable “safety valve” for the indigent. 1 To date, the
United States First Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to select
a single legal test for determining undue hardship under the
United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”). 2
Within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit, bankruptcy courts
are free to choose an approach to evaluate undue hardship. 3
In an effort to ensure consistency throughout the bankruptcy
courts within the First Circuit, it would be ideal if the First
Circuit would choose one of the undue hardship tests.
However, until the First Circuit changes its position, the
concept of undue hardship will be left open to judicial
interpretation. This note explores the various undue hardship
tests available to the First Circuit, and provides examples of
how those tests have been applied by different courts. The
two dominant tests in the First Circuit, the Brunner test and
the Totality of the Circumstances test, will be explored in
depth.



Candidate for J.D., 2010, Southern New England School of Law,
North Dartmouth, Massachusetts.
1
Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 330 B.R. 323, 324
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005).
2
See Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 735 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2006).
3
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 312 B.R. 200, 206
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004).
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I. BACKGROUND

In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) amended the Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The purpose of the amendment was, in
part, to ensure the continued prevention of abuse by graduates
attempting to discharge student loans “on the eve of a
lucrative career.” 4 Furthermore, the amendment sought to
protect the solvency and perpetuity of student loan
programs. 5
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 7 debtor is
entitled to discharge all debts which arose prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition. 6 This is a fundamental principle
underlying the Bankruptcy Code, because it provides an
honest debtor with a “fresh start”. 7 A major exception to the
“fresh start” concept is the undue hardship doctrine, which
provides that most student loan debt is exempt from the
general rule of discharge unless such debt “would impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” 8
A student loan will not be discharged “[u]nless the debtor
affirmatively secures a hardship determination.” 9 An
educational debt will not be discharged unless the debtor can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that repayment
of the debt would impose an undue hardship on the debtor
and the debtor’s dependants. 10

4

Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program Inc. (In re Andresen), 232
B.R. 127, 130 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
5
See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. Corp. (In re
Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1987).
6
11 U.S.C. § 727(a), (b) (2009).
7
Burkhead v. United States (In re Burkhead), 304 B.R. 560, 565
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2004) (citing Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf),
245 B.R. 731, 744 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000)).
8
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2009).
9
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 450 (2004).
10
See Smith v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Smith), 328 B.R.
605, 610–11 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005).
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The initial burden is on the creditor to prove that the debt
exists and that it is the type of loan exempt from general
Chapter 7 discharge. Once the creditor satisfies that
requirement, the burden then shifts to the debtor to prove
undue hardship. 11 In addition to filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition, a debtor must also initiate an adversarial proceeding
against their student loan creditors in order to attempt to
discharge student loan debt.
While undue hardship remains statutorily undefined as of
the last revision of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 several courts
have formulated different tests to determine undue hardship.
For example, there is the Bryant Poverty Level test, 13 the
Brunner test, 14 the Totality of the Circumstances test,15 and
the Johnson test. 16 Neither the Bryant test nor the Johnson
test have been used in the First Circuit, they are being
highlighted merely to provide other schools of thought for
determining undue hardship, and to provide a backdrop of the
jurisprudential landscape. The Brunner test and the Totality
of the Circumstances test dominate the First Circuit. “Most
courts within the First Circuit have adopted the ‘totality of
circumstances’ test. . . . Nevertheless, several courts within
this circuit have applied the Brunner test.” 17 The Bankruptcy
Code does not provide for a particular test. As a result, the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit has held the
bankruptcy courts are free to choose their own approach
when analyzing undue hardship cases. 18
11

See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Savage (In re Savage), 311 B.R.
835, 839 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004).
12
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 109 P.L. 8 § 220, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)).
13
Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant),
72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
14
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner),
831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
15
Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews),
661 F.2d. 702 (8th Cir. 1981).
16
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re Johnson),
5 B.C.D. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979).
17
Paul v. Suffolk Univ. (In re Paul), 337 B.R. 730, 736 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2006).
18
See id.
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There is limited legislative history on undue hardship, but
many courts have cited a 1973 Report of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States when formulating
or adopting a test:
[Student loans] should not be dischargeable as
a matter of policy before [the debtor] has
demonstrated that for any reason he is unable
to earn sufficient income to maintain himself
and his dependents and to repay the
educational debt. In order to determine
whether nondischargeability of the debt will
impose an “undue hardship” on the debtor, the
rate and amount of his future resources should
be estimated reasonably in terms of ability to
obtain, retain and continue employment and
the rate of pay that can be expected. Any
unearned income or other wealth which the
debtor can be expected to receive should also
be taken into account. The total amount of
income, its reliability, and the periodicity of its
receipt should be adequate to maintain the
debtor and his dependents at a minimal
standard of living within their management
capability, as well as to pay the educational
debt. 19
The above quote provides the only legislative intent as to
the original meaning of undue hardship. The analysis in the
above quote is the starting point from which all of these tests
are formulated. The undue hardship doctrine is an elusive
standard. Courts have historically struggled to formulate tests
for its application. 20 Typically, student loans are exempt from
19

Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18,
25–26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (citing Communication from the Executive
Director, Commission on the Bankruptcy laws of the United States,
Transmitting a Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy laws of the
United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. II, 140
n.15, 140–41 n.17 (1973)).
20
See In re Paul, 337 B.R. at 735.

2009

Discharging Student Loans

147

discharge; however, a finding of undue hardship will remove
that exemption and allow the debtor to discharge the student
loan debt along with other debt through bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, this language is not always used in a
consistent manner.

II. THE TESTS

A. The Bryant Poverty Level Test

The Bryant Poverty Level test, from the Third Circuit,
creates a rebuttable presumption of undue hardship. Under
the Bryant test, if the debtor’s income is below the federal
poverty level, then undue hardship exists and the student
loans are discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. Conversely,
if the debtor’s income is above the federal poverty level, the
loans are presumed to remain exempt from discharge. The
debtor or the creditor can rebut this presumption by offering
evidence of extenuating circumstances. This test is an attempt
by the Eastern District Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Pennsylvania to add some sort of objectivity to the undue
hardship doctrine. 21 It should be noted that this test has not
gained widespread acceptance, and it has never been used in
the First Circuit.

B. The Johnson Test

The Johnson test, also from the Third Circuit, considers a
debtor’s salary, wages, skills, sex, employment history,
current employment, education, health, transportation,

21

See Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant),
72 B.R. 913, 915–19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
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dependants, and other income. 22 The bankruptcy court
determines the debtor’s reasonable expenses while
maintaining a minimal standard of living for the debtor and
the debtor’s dependants. 23 Next, the court analyzes if the
income can support the debtor’s expenses and repayment of
the loans. 24 In addition, the Johnson test requires either a
good faith test or a policy inquiry test to be applied. The good
faith test requires the debtor to show a “bona fide attempt to
repay the loan.” 25 A bona fide attempt may include taking
advantage of all employment opportunities, minimizing
expenditures, and maximizing resources. 26 The policy inquiry
test requires the court to weigh the discharge against the
policy behind 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). If the court “concludes
either that the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition
was to discharge the student loan debt or the debtor has
definitely benefitted financially from the education which the
loan helped to finance,” the loans will not be discharged. 27
Like the Bryant test, the Johnson test has not gained
widespread acceptance, and it has never been used in the First
Circuit.

C. The Brunner Test

The Brunner test, from the Second Circuit, is the most
prevalent test used to determine undue hardship in a majority
of the Circuits. 28 The three prongs to the Brunner test are as
follows:
22

See Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 737
(Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (citing Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v.
Johnson (In re Johnson), 5 B.C.D. 532, 536–39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)).
23
See id. at 737 (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 538).
24
Id. at 737–38 (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 544).
25
Id. at 738 (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 540 (citing A. Ahart,
Discharging Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 207
(Summer 1978))).
26
See id. (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 541–42, 544).
27
Id. (citing In re Johnson, 5 B.C.D. at 544).
28
See, e.g., Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397
F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys (In re
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(1) The debtor cannot maintain, based on current
income, a minimal standard of living for
themselves and their dependants if forced to
repay the loans;
(2) Additional circumstances exist indicating that
this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period of
the student loans; and
(3) The debtor has made good faith efforts to
repay the loans. 29
The debtor has the burden of proving each prong of the
Brunner test 30 by a preponderance of the evidence. 31
The first prong, also known as the “minimal standard”
prong, requires a thorough examination of the debtor’s
financial position. The debtor must prove that he or she
cannot maintain a minimal standard of living and repay the
loans. This is analyzed based on the debtor’s current income
and reasonable expenses. 32
The second prong in the Brunner test, also known as the
future prospects element, requires a showing of a likelihood
that the debtor’s position is likely to persist. This test requires
the courts to consider whether “additional circumstances exist
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant portion of the repayment period of the student

Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2005); Hemar Ins. Corp. v. Cox (In re
Cox), 338 F. 3d 1238 (11th Cir. 2003); U.S. Dep’t of Educ. v. Gerhardt
(In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003); United Student Aid Funds,
Inc. v. Pena (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ.
Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995); Ill.
Student Assistance Comm’n v. Roberson (In re Roberson), 999 F.2d 1132
(7th Cir. 1993).
29
Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner),
831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
30
See Lehman v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Lehman),
226 B.R. 805, 808 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998).
31
See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
32
King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 358,
367 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).
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loans.” 33 “These additional circumstances must be
‘extraordinary and exceptional and generally indicate a
hopelessness for the indefinite future as to any possibility of
repayment.’” 34 There is some debate as to whether this
requires certainty of hopelessness. Many courts seem to be
swayed by a probability that the debtor’s current
circumstances will persist for a substantial amount of time. 35
Such circumstances where undue hardship has been found
include debilitating or terminal illnesses, disabilities, or
responsibility for an unusually large number of dependants. 36
The third prong of the Brunner test resembles the Johnson
test by requiring a showing of good faith by the debtor. 37 It
requires the debtor to make a good faith effort to repay the
loans. 38 This is measured by payments, and “efforts to obtain
employment, maximize income, and minimize expenses.”39
“In making this assessment, a court should examine the
debtor’s standard of living, with a view toward ascertaining
whether the debtor has attempted to minimize the expenses of
[themselves] and [their] dependants.” 40 The debtor has to

33

Neal v. N.H. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. (In re Neal),
354 B.R. 583, 589 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2006) (citing In re Brunner, 831 F.2d
at 396).
34
Id. (citing McClain v. Am. Student Assistance (In re McClain),
272 B.R. 42, 48 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2002)).
35
See In re King, 368 B.R. at 367–68.
36
Santamassino v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth. (In re
Santamassino), 373 B.R. 807 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007) (citing In re Thoms,
257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)); In re King, 368 B.R. at
370–71; Kelsey v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Kelsey), 287
B.R. 132, 142, 144 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2001)).
37
Kopf v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 738
(Bankr. D. Me. 2000).
38
Id. See also In re Neal, 354 B.R. at 590 (citing Brunner v. N.Y.
State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
39
King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 358,
373 (citing O’Hearn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re O’Hearn),
339 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2003)).
40
Burton v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Burton), 339 B.R. 856,
870 (Bankr. E. D. Va. 2006) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Services v. Smitley (In re Smitley), 347 F.3d 109, 117 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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maximize his or her income potential and minimize expenses
to only “reasonably necessary expenses.” 41
The circuits which have adopted the Brunner test,
“maintain it provides a workable, easily articulated
framework for courts and parties to follow while still
allowing for a fact– and case-sensitive determination.” 42 It is
also praised as being a “simple[] rubric” that fosters certainty
and predictability. 43 The certain factors of the Brunner test
provide consistent results. 44 However, the test is highly
criticized especially within the First and Eighth Circuits.
“[R]equiring our bankruptcy courts to adhere to the strict
parameters of a particular test would diminish the inherent
discretion contained in [11 U.S.C.] § 523(a)(8)(B).” 45 Courts
adhering to the Totality of the Circumstances test claim it is
too rigid and inflexible. “The more equitable judgment is
hemmed in by rules, the less equitable it becomes.” 46 Despite
this criticism, the Brunner test remains the most used test
throughout the jurisdictions. 47
The following cases are chosen to illustrate in which
circumstances the courts within the First and Second Circuits
have found undue hardship under the Brunner test.

41

Smith v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Smith), 328 B.R. 605,
613 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005).
42
Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 25
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (citing Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Oyler), 397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.
Polleys (In re Polleys), 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005); U.S. Dep’t
of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 2003); In
re Faish, 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995)).
43
In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 25.
44
See id.
45
Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 330 B.R. 323,
325 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (citing Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In
re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir. 2003)).
46
Id. at 326.
47
See In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 24–25.
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1) Santamassino v. New Jersey
Student Assistance Authority 48

In 2006, Joan Santamassino, a plaintiff with student loan
debt, initiated an adversarial proceeding to discharge over
$16,000 in student loans. The note became due in 1986, and
she made “sporadic payments.” 49 The guarantor paid the note
in 1988. From 1989 until 2003, the debtor made 107
payments totaling $20,661. She did not make a payment after
2003. 50
The plaintiff’s mother was diagnosed with Parkinson’s
disease twenty-three years prior to this action. Upon her
mother’s deterioration, the debtor quit her law practice in
New Jersey to care for her. Santamassino and her husband
relocated to Vermont to care for her mother who required
twenty-four hour care. In 2001, the debtor and her husband,
the sole earner for the household, divorced. As a result, the
debtor was forced to live exclusively on her mother’s social
security and pension benefits. 51
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont applied
the Brunner test to Santamassino’s case, in order to determine
if undue hardship existed. The court found the first prong of
the Brunner test, the minimal standard requirement, was
satisfied by the debtor, a decision which was not challenged
by the creditor. The prong requires the debtor to show they
cannot maintain a minimal standard of living and repay the
student loans. The debtor’s mother’s social security and
pension benefits totaled just over $3,100 per month, but their
monthly expenses exceeded $3,500. The court deemed the
expenses were reasonable, and held that the debtor could not
maintain a minimal standard of living if she was required to
repay the student loans. 52
48

Santamassino v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth. (In re
Santamassino), 373 B.R. 807 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).
49
Id. at 810.
50
See id.
51
See id. at 812.
52
See id. at 811.
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The court found the plaintiff had met the second prong of
the Brunner test, the additional and exceptional
circumstances requirement. This prong requires a showing
that exceptional circumstances are present, prohibiting
payment of the loan. It must also be shown the circumstances
are likely to persist into the foreseeable future. The debtor
devoted nearly all of her time to the long term care of her ill
mother, including cooking, cleaning, shopping, providing
personal care, helping with medications, driving her mother
to appointments, paying her bills, and generally availing to
the needs of her mother twenty-four hours a day. 53 This time
commitment made it impossible for the debtor to earn extra
income. The doctor testified that the debtor’s mother’s
condition is “chronic and progressive.” 54 She is in the late
stages of the disease and she is likely to live “several more
years.” 55 These circumstances were additional and
exceptional, thus satisfying the second prong of the Brunner
test. 56
Santamassino also satisfied the third prong of the Brunner
test, the good faith requirement. The debtor repaid over half
of the loan between 1983 and 2003. She made payments from
1983 to 1986, then requested and received forbearance, but
later resumed payments from late 1986 through 1988.
Between 1989 and 2003, she made another 107 payments. 57
Although the debtor was unable to seek or maintain
employment since 2000, she still made many payments, even
selling personal property to do so. The court found that her
efforts to maximize income and minimize expenses satisfied
the third “good faith” prong of the Brunner test. 58 The court
also held that the debtor’s mother could be considered a
dependent, and that the services she provided to her mother
were invaluable. The court seemed reluctant to impute bad

53

See id. at 812.
Santamassino v. N.J. Higher Educ. Student Assistance Auth. (In re
Santamassino), 373 B.R. 807, 812 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).
55
Id.
56
See id.
57
See id. at 812–13.
58
See id. at 813.
54
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faith on a person foregoing a career to benefit an ailing
parent.
The facts showed that the debtor satisfied the Brunner
test. She could not maintain minimal living standards and
repay the loans on just her mother’s pension. The twenty-four
hour care she provided to her mother was exceptional and
likely to persist. She exercised good faith by making many
payments on the loans when able to do so. Consequently, the
court found that the debtor was entitled to discharge her
student loans to avoid imposing undue hardship on the
debtor. 59
2) Markison v. Educational Credit Management Corp. 60

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont
determined that the debtor, Lynda Markison, did not satisfy
her burden of proving the three Brunner prongs. 61 Markison
had one dependant in high school, but the dependant lived
with an adult sibling. The debtor earned a degree from
Lyndon State College, Lyndonville, Vermont in 1994. At the
time of her bankruptcy filing, the debtor’s income was
$21,000, plus she received money for room, board, and travel
expenses associated with her employment. The creditor,
Educational Credit Management Corporation, held the
debtor’s student loan note with a balance of $42,491 in
February 2006, which accrued interest at a rate of 4.13% per
year. 62
The court found that the debtor did not satisfy the first
prong of the Brunner test, the minimum standard
requirement. In applying the first prong, the court took into
consideration that the debtor traveled extensively for her job,
and all of her travel expenses were covered by her employer.
59

See id. at 813–14.
Markison v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Markison), 2007 WL
1668777 (Bankr. D. Vt.).
61
See id. at 1.
62
See id at 2.
60
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Markison was employed about eighty percent of the year and
averaged $1,171 in income per month. The court found her
current monthly expenses to be $1,344, which was not
enough to maintain a minimum standard of living if her
expenses were reasonable. 63 However, Markison spent $984
per month on travel expenses, accounting for eighty percent
of her income, in order to travel back to Vermont on the
weekends. 64 The court found her travel expenses
unreasonable, since all of her expenses would be covered if
she remained at her job location. 65
As a result of the court’s determination that the travel
expenses were unreasonable, the court dismissed her claim.
The reasoning was that if Markison had recalculated her
budget and reduced her traveling expenses, she would have
had ample resources to make payments on her student loans
and maintain a minimal standard of living. An inability to
travel at one’s discretion cannot be classified as an undue
hardship. 66 The court recognized the failure of one prong of
the Brunner test should end the analysis, and the student loan
debt should remain exempt from discharge.67 However, the
court still chose to continue its analysis.
The second prong requires additional and exceptional
circumstances indicating the debtor’s inability to pay the
loans will extend indefinitely into the future. 68 In the
stipulated facts at pre-trial, the debtor admitted that she did
not suffer a disability. She had only one dependant who did
not even live with her. She had a decent job with benefits,
even though it may not have been ideal. In the thirteen years
following her graduation, she continuously found
employment. The debtor’s circumstances did not amount to
additional and exceptional under the Brunner test. The court
found the debtor’s condition was not likely to persist for the
duration of the repayment period, and that she was able
63

See id.
See id. at 3.
65
See id. at 4.
66
See Markison v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Markison), 2007
WL 1668777, 5 (Bankr. D. Vt.).
67
See id.
68
See id.
64
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bodied, healthy, and could find better employment in the
future. Consequently, the debtor did not meet her burden of
proof; therefore, her student loans remained exempt from
discharge. 69
Ultimately, if a debtor fails to meet one element of the
Brunner test, the debtor’s student loans will remain exempt
from discharge in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Vermont analyzed the debtor’s circumstances
under prongs one and two of the Brunner test, but did not
engage in a good faith discussion under the third prong.
Nevertheless, the court found that the debtor was not entitled
to a finding of undue hardship after failing both the first and
second prongs.
3) King v. Vermont Student Assistance Corp. 70

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont ruled
that James King was entitled to a finding of undue hardship
and a subsequent discharge of his student loans. King
acquired loans to finance an undergraduate degree at
Northeastern University in Boston and a graduate degree at
Schiller University in Paris. 71 As of January 2006, King had
two notes totaling over $120,000, including interest and
principal. He was eligible for an Income Contingent
Repayment Plan (“ICRP”), which calculated payments of $0
based on current income and marital status at the time of his
filing of a bankruptcy petition. 72 In his best year between
graduating and filing for bankruptcy, King grossed $20,000
and made payments on his student loans. He stopped working
in 2003 and did not work again, although he applied for many
jobs. He filed for bankruptcy in 2005. 73 In May 2006, King
69

See id. at 6.
King v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp. (In re King), 368 B.R. 358
(Bankr. D. Vt. 2007).
71
See id. at 360.
72
See id. at 361.
73
See id. at 359.
70
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had a major mental breakdown accompanied by suicidal
inclinations, resulting in his hospitalization for eight days. 74
King had a history of mental illness. He began seeing a
psychiatrist in 2001, and then started in 2002 to see the
mental health professional who testified at his trial, Dr.
Catherine Hickey. 75 Dr. Hickey testified as to King’s existing
and past mental health. 76 The doctor’s initial diagnosis was
that King suffered from major depression. The doctor treated
him with medication, but his condition did not improve. Over
time, Dr. Hickey observed “hypomanic episodes followed by
a depressive episode,” 77 so she upgraded her diagnosis to
bipolar disorder. She could not with certainty claim his state
would persist indefinitely, but opined it was a “lifelong
disorder . . . King has had at least one; if not several
hypomanic episodes, he is definitely at risk of having
others.” 78
The court concluded that King’s condition, coupled with
stress, made employment extremely difficult. Both King’s
doctor and his mother’s testimony were compelling and
credible. The court also determined that his mental health
condition was likely to persist indefinitely into the future.
One creditor conceded that King had made a good faith effort
to repay his loans while he was employed. 79 Education Credit
Management Corp., another creditor, claimed the availability
of an Income Contingent Repayment Plan made discharge of
the loans unnecessary, because the note would be in
abeyance, with payments of $0, until King found adequate
employment. The court was not persuaded by this argument
because the mentally and emotionally unstable debtor would
still face enormous debt if he found a job.
The court found King had satisfied all three prongs of the
Brunner test, and ordered that his student loans be
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discharged. 80 King received only $631 per month in Social
Security Disability benefits. This was inadequate to maintain
a minimal standard of living and make payments on his
student loans, satisfying the first prong. 81 The court found
that King’s mental condition was additional and exceptional
and likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment
period. This satisfied the second prong of Brunner. 82 The
third prong, requiring a good faith effort to repay the loans,
was also satisfied. He attempted to repay the loans when he
was employed. He “maximized his income, minimized his
expenses, and made reasonable efforts to find a job when he
was not employed.” 83

4) Neal v. New Hampshire Higher
Education Assistance Foundation 84

Peggy and Thomas Neal initiated an adversarial
proceeding to discharge six individual Stafford student loans
owed by Peggy Neal. The aggregate total of the loans was
$22,570, and as of August 2006, $30,449 was due. The
debtors originally filed a Chapter 13 petition and made
regular, but sometimes late, payments to their trustee based
on a court approved payment plan. Part of the plan was to pay
creditors, including the New Hampshire Higher Education
Assistance Foundation (NHHEAF), with a lump sum from a
pending personal injury action. Unfortunately, the attorney
retained to handle the debtors’ tort action failed to perform
his duties and the case was dismissed. Subsequently, the
debtors revised their bankruptcy filing to a Chapter 7
petition. 85
80
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Peggy Neal was a forty-seven year old woman who was
employed in the automotive industry for twelve years. From
1996 to 1999, she was enrolled as a part time student at New
Hampshire Technical College, during which time she
accumulated student loans to pay for the tuition. Mrs. Neal’s
intention was to study computers to become more marketable
and to increase her earning potential. 86 In 2003, Mrs. Neal
lost her job, but was able to find new employment performing
data entry for $10.00 per hour. At one point, she was working
a combined seventy-five hours per week as a bus driver and
as a Wal-Mart cashier. She eventually quit driving a bus to
have more time to care for her ailing husband, but she
continued to work thirty-two hours per week at Wal-Mart
because the job provided health benefits. 87
Thomas Neal was granted a discharge of his student loans
by the Department of Education after a finding in 2005 that
he was disabled. While the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of New Hampshire was only analyzing Peggy Neal’s student
loans under the undue hardship doctrine, Mr. Neal’s failing
health was pertinent to the court’s analysis. Mr. Neal was
diabetic, obese, suffered from depression, as well as chronic
back pain from an injury. That back injury was the basis of
the failed personal injury action mentioned above. Mr. Neal
was unable to stand for any significant period, and required
assistance from Mrs. Neal to dress, shower, and cook. 88
Peggy Neal earned $1,050 per month while Thomas Neal
drew $872 in disability, resulting in a combined monthly
income of $1,922. Their monthly expenses at the time of trial
were $2,714 and apparently modest. Peggy Neal’s student
loans were due January 2000. She requested and received a
no pay forbearance. She never made a payment on her
loans. 89
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The court applied the Brunner test for undue hardship to
the Neals’ case. The first prong, the minimal standard of
living requirement, requires debtors to maximize income and
minimize expenses and still be unable to make payments on
their student loans. The Neals’ satisfied this prong of the test.
The court determined that the Neals’ spending was very
frugal. The only expense of contention was a $97 cable bill,
which was found to be reasonable in light of Mr. Neal’s
disabled condition. The court also found that Mrs. Neal only
working one job was reasonable in light of her caretaker
status. She was working full time at a fair wage. The court
seemed to indicate that a debtor who seeks undue hardship
must work full time if able to do so. The first prong was
satisfied by the Neals’ frugal expenses and Mrs. Neal’s full
time job. 90
The second prong of the Brunner test considers whether
additional circumstances exist, which make payment unlikely
for a significant portion of the repayment period. 91 Since Mr.
Neal was disabled, he was on a fixed income, which was not
likely to increase. Mrs. Neal, although working full time,
could only work limited hours in order to provide the care her
husband required. “Mr. Neal’s health is an extraordinary
circumstance that limits both himself and Mrs. Neal.” 92 The
debtors satisfied the second Brunner prong because of Mr.
Neal’s health, and the care he required from Mrs. Neal. 93
The third good faith prong of the Brunner test was also
satisfied. This requires the debtors to “make monthly
payments and/or attempting to negotiate an alternative
payment plan with the lender.” 94 Peggy Neal applied for a no
pay forbearance, which was granted. At the time of the Neals’
bankruptcy filing, Mrs. Neal’s loans were deemed technically
current. The debtors made regular payments to their Chapter
13 trustee for four years under the assumption NHHEAF was
participating as a creditor in the proceeding. The debtors also
90
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proposed paying the note along with other debts from the
proceeds of their pending personal injury action. Through no
fault of their own, the debtors’ personal injury suit was
dismissed. The debtors did not exercise bad faith, therefore,
they satisfied the third element of the Brunner test entitling
them to discharge Mrs. Neal’s student loans. 95

D. The Totality of the Circumstances Test

The Totality of the Circumstances test is the most popular
test in the First Circuit. 96 The Eighth Circuit has also
expressly adopted the test. 97 In the First Circuit, in the
absence of controlling authority, bankruptcy courts are free to
choose an approach to evaluate undue hardship. 98 Most
courts within the First Circuit apply the Totality of the
Circumstances test. 99 The Totality of the Circumstances test
reviews all relevant factors and circumstances surrounding a
particular bankruptcy case. The factors include a debtor’s
past, present and reasonably reliable future financial
resources, as well as reasonably necessary living expenses. 100
It is also essential to consider all of the factors relevant to
whether a debtor can maintain himself and his dependants
now and into the reasonably foreseeable future, while
continuing to repay his educational debt. 101
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The Totality of the Circumstances test analysis, reduced
to elements, requires a debtor to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence the following:
1) The debtor’s past, present, and reasonably
reliable future financial resources;
2) The debtor’s and all dependants’
reasonably necessary living expenses; and
3) All other relevant facts or circumstances
unique to the debtor’s case that prevent the
debtor from paying the student loans in
question, while still maintaining a minimal
standard of living. 102
In Hicks v. Educational Credit Management Corp., 103
Judge Henry J. Boroff eloquently reduces the Totality of the
Circumstances test to “one simple question: Can the debtor
now, and in the foreseeable future, maintain a reasonable,
minimal standard of living for the debtor and the debtor’s
dependants and still afford to make payments on the debtor’s
student loans?” 104 The courts should consider all relevant
factors, including a debtor’s income, expenses, health, age,
education, number of dependants, personal and family
circumstances, monthly payments required to service student
loans, effect of bankruptcy discharge of other debt, prospects
for increased income, and ability to minimize expenses, and
any other relevant factors. 105 Many courts condense the
elements of the test into the one simple question, list all of the
relevant facts, and conclude whether a finding of undue
hardship is warranted.
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The Totality of the Circumstances test is praised for its
flexible and meticulous fact specific approach. Proponents
speculate that Congress’ choice to use a broad phrase such as
undue hardship was intentional. The statute is devoid of any
definition or explanation of the term and does not mandate a
particular test. 106 In doing so, Congress gave bankruptcy
judges the authority and responsibility to decide on a case-bycase basis whether the debtor is entitled to a finding of undue
hardship. 107 It is “simply an adjuration to the decision maker
to make an honest and intelligent judgment after having given
due consideration to all the information the parties
provide . . . .” 108 The test is criticized by courts adhering to
Brunner as undermining consistency, predictability, and
fairness by allowing too much judicial discretion. This
criticism is countered by the fact that lenity is not always the
result of flexibility; a judge may make a sound discretionary
decision with the aid of all the facts pertinent to the case. 109
The following cases provide examples of how courts
within the First Circuit have applied the Totality of the
Circumstances test for undue hardship.
1) Brunell v. Citibank 110

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts in
Brunell held that the forty-one year old debtor, Jennifer Gail
Brunell, who was employed in the health care industry, was
not entitled to a finding of undue hardship. 111 The debtor
lived in Rhode Island, was divorced, and had custody of her
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three young children. 112 In September 2006, the debtor owed
in excess of $200,000, which would require payments of
almost $1,300 per month for thirty years to repay. 113 The
debtor qualified for an Income Contingent Repayment Plan
(ICR). Based on her reported income, the debtor’s payment
would have been $153 per month in 2005 and $260 per
month in 2006. 114
The debtor’s educational history from which the loans
arise is substantial. In 1987, she obtained a bachelor’s degree
in electrical engineering from Worcester Polytechnic
Institute. 115 She earned a master’s degree in psychology from
Lesley College in 1995. 116 She attended a Ph.D. program at
Suffolk University from 1996 until she dropped out in 2001,
due to her being pregnant with twins. 117 The debtor then
sought to change her career to the medical profession while
being supported by her husband. However, she separated
from her husband of seventeen years in 2003, and divorced in
2005. 118
The debtor’s work history was continuous. From 2004 to
the time of the suit, the debtor maintained employment in the
mental health field. She worked at the Attleboro Community
Care Center, South Bay Mental Health Services, and at time
of trial at the Early Intervention Program in Taunton where
she earned $17.50 per hour plus mileage and gas
reimbursement. 119 To increase her earning potential, the
debtor needed to obtain a state license, which required further
training and an exam. In addition to the debtor’s salary, she
also received $704 per month in child support, plus a
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percentage of any bonuses or commissions her ex-spouse
may receive. 120
A thorough examination of her expenditures was not
challenged as unreasonable. 121 The court found the debtor
had approximately $190 in disposable income. Brunell’s
expenses had fluctuated to smaller amounts in the past
year. 122 Based on projected income and ICR payments, the
debtor was only required to cut her budget by $70–$110 per
month to make her student loan payments. 123
The debtor failed to establish that the continued payment
of her student loans would constitute an undue hardship. 124
The debtor was found to be bright and very well educated.
Her prospects for better and higher paying employment were
good. She was in good health. She would only be required to
reduce her expenditures modestly to maintain a minimal
standard of living for herself and her dependants in order to
make payments on her educational debt.

2) Dufrense v. New Hampshire Higher
Education Assistance Foundation 125

The debtor in this case was a law school graduate who
failed the bar nine times. The court found she met her burden
of proof, and thus was entitled to a finding of undue hardship.
She graduated from her undergraduate studies in 1994 and
from law school in 1997. 126 The balance of her student loans
was over $106,000. Dufrense’s most recent employment was
as a legal assistant and a real estate paralegal. Her ability to
work full time was seriously impaired by a degenerative back
120
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condition. Her condition required surgeries, including spinal
fusion, and it was likely that she would require more
surgeries in the future. 127
She was a forty-five year old divorcee with children who
were not considered dependants. Her salary averaged $43,000
in 2002 and 2003, but dropped dramatically to $12,000 in
2004, a year in which she also received over $12,000 in
disability. 128 Her expenses at trial, after discharge of
approximately $8,000 in Chapter 7 debts, were $1,780. Her
income for 2005 included six months of full time
employment at $2,800 per month and one month of
temporary work at $1,280. 129 She received no disability,
retirement or public assistance since 2004. The best
repayment plan she could procure was a twenty year term at
an interest rate of 3.375%. This would amount to payments of
$621 per month and forgiveness of any unpaid portions at the
end of the term. 130
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts
found that the exception of her student loans from discharge
would impose an undue hardship on the debtor. Judge Robert
Somma refused to adhere to any particular test because he did
not have to in the First Circuit. 131 He stated that his
considerations in reaching his conclusion were: “debtor’s
financial history and condition, her age, her marital status, her
employment record and prospects, her family obligations, her
resources actual and projected, her health and medical
condition, her honest effort and good faith in addressing her
debts, and all other factors and considerations presented in
evidence . . . .” 132 His analysis was very similar to a typical
totality of the circumstances approach, although he refused to
call it that. He used all relevant factors and considerations
presented into evidence. 133
127
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The court held that the debtor’s income was already
insufficient to cover her expenses. She lived modestly at a
very minimal level. Her prospects for regular future
employment were uncertain at best, and her back was almost
certain to deteriorate and require more surgeries. 134 Even if
the loans were to remain in forbearance, the debtor would
still be faced by mounting interest, stress from the debt, and a
credit report with the massive debt reported. To burden a
debtor who could barely work and afford modest living
standards with a $621 per month student loan payment would
impose an undue hardship. 135
3) Paul v. Suffolk University 136

The debtor in this case, Lunise Paul, did not prove that
repayment of her school loans would impose an undue
hardship on her and her dependants. The debtor received both
a Bachelor’s degree in general studies and a Masters degree
in Public Administration from Suffolk University in Boston.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Suffolk University
forgave $4,200 of the debtor’s loans, stipulating that the
repayment would constitute an undue hardship on the
debtor. 137 Educational Credit Management Corporation
(“ECMC”) held seven notes totaling $53,000, and took a
contrary position. The debtor’s work history since graduation
was at various data entry and health assistant positions
ranging from ten to fifteen dollars per hour. From 2003 to the
date of the trial, she worked as a home health coordinator. 138
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The debtor was a thirty-four year old single mother. She
had three children ranging from age three to ten. English was
her second language. 139 The two fathers of the debtor’s
children provided no child support, and she claimed to know
the whereabouts of only one of them. 140 The debtor claimed
that her childcare responsibilities and poor English language
skills limited her ability to procure a higher paying job, both
presently and in the foreseeable future. The debtor also
claimed the standard of living for her and her three
dependants were below minimal standards. She did not have
health insurance. She had a twelve year old vehicle that was
in disrepair. She also claimed an inability to afford
recreational or cultural activities for her family. 141
The debtor’s expenses were modest. She did not own a
VCR or DVD player, did not subscribe to cable, and did not
own a computer. She shared an apartment with her parents
and paid $1,000 rent while her parents paid all of the
utilities. 142 She received Women, Infants, and Children
vouchers for the purchase of milk, cheese, juice, and peanut
butter, but no other form of public assistance. 143 She did,
however, own a $25,000 certificate of deposit, which she had
received in settlement from an action against an agent of
ECMC’s predecessor in interest for alleged unfair debt
collection and stay violations. 144 She also qualified for an
ICR. Based on her income, amount borrowed, and family
size, her payments would be $188 per month for nineteen and
a half years. 145
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The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts,
applying the totality of the circumstances test, held that the
debtor did not meet her burden of establishing undue
hardship. The debtor’s student loans would, therefore, remain
exempt from general bankruptcy discharge. 146 The Court
reasoned that the debtor had not used any of her $25,000
dollar settlement to pay down her student loans. Each year
she received a significant tax return. Her 2004 return was
over $7,000, approximately $585 per month in extra income.
The Court also found it unreasonable that a person with the
debtor’s level of education could not search and acquire
higher paying employment. 147
The debtor was also found to have failed to maximize her
income by not seeking support from the fathers of her
children. Massachusetts General Laws provide guidelines for
support and enforcement of child support orders. 148 Taking
into account all of these factors, as well as the debtor’s
refusal to consolidate her loans and take advantage of an ICR,
the Court found she failed to establish that repayment of her
student loans would constitute an undue hardship. 149

4) Gharavi v. United States
Department of Education 150

The debtor in this case, Minoo Gharavi, was granted a
finding of undue hardship by the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Massachusetts, resulting in a partial discharge of
most of her student loans. Only one loan remained exempt
from discharge, which she would have to pay off. The debtor
earned a Bachelor’s degree in architecture from Texas
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Southern University in 1987. 151 In 1993, she decided to
return to school at New England College of Optometry to
pursue a doctorate in optomology. She took a leave of
absence during the 1995–96 school year because she
developed optic neuritis. She withdrew again during the
1996–97 school year after being diagnosed with Graves’
disease. She failed out of school in the fall of 1997 because
the medication that she had to take to treat her condition
affected her concentration and memory. 152
She was able to find employment as an ophthalmic
technician from 2002 until trial. Her wage at the time of trial
was $19.75 per hour for about forty hours per week. 153 In
2002, she was also diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. There
are many side effects from the medication to treat the disease,
as well as from the disease itself. The most pertinent side
effect is chronic fatigue. The balance of her student loans at
trial was over $63,000, and she never made a payment. 154 An
analysis of Ms. Gharavi’s income and expenses revealed a
surplus of $62. The most generous payment schedule offered
by the defendants was $419 per month. 155
The court applied the Totality of the Circumstances test
and held the debtor was entitled to a finding of undue
hardship. Multiple sclerosis is a degenerative disease and the
debtor’s medical condition was almost certain to deteriorate
over time. She made a decent wage and her fatigue prevented
her from being able to work a second job. The debtor also
lived with her mother, who only drew social security benefits
to supplement the household income. 156 After reviewing the
evidence, the court held that the debtor’s circumstances
warranted undue hardship and a partial discharge. All but one
of the debtor’s student loans were discharged. 157
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The most notable aspect of this case was the court’s
assessment of the monthly household expenditures on
cigarettes by the debtor and her mother. The two smoked a
combined thirty five packs a month, amounting to a total
household expense of $175 per month on tobacco. After a
lengthy discussion and citing significant authority, the Court
found that this monthly tobacco expenditure was
reasonable. 158

III. CONCLUSION

The fact undue hardship is a lofty standard gets lost in the
debate over which test is the most appropriate template in
which to gauge undue hardship. Congress has erected a high
hurdle to debtors seeking to discharge student loan
obligations. The line seems to be drawn somewhere higher
than mere inability to pay and a little less than certain
hopelessness. “Hardship alleged . . . must be undue and
attributable to truly exceptional circumstances, such as illness
or the existence of an unusually large number of
dependents.” 159 “Financial adversity alone is insufficient to
warrant a student loan discharge on the basis of undue
hardship.” 160 No matter which test is employed, the debtor’s
circumstances must be dire and bleak.
The issue of which test will be applied is going to vary by
district and judge until a case comes down with binding
precedent. Until there is such a binding precedent, plaintiffs
must be prepared to argue either the Totality of the
Circumstances test or the Brunner test in the First Circuit.
While the tests are similar in the evidence required to
overcome the plaintiff’s burden, they still differ. The most
notable divergence is the Brunner test’s good faith
158
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requirement. While it is not required in a totality analysis, it
is a relevant factor and may be part of the analysis. It is an
essential element of a prima facie case in a Brunner
jurisdiction, and failure to prove good faith by a
preponderance of the evidence is failure to acquire a finding
of undue hardship.

